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This paper develops methods for evaluating marginal policy changes. We characterize how the
eects of marginal policy changes depend on the direction of the policy change, and show that
marginal policy eects are fundamentally easier to identify and to estimate than conventional treat-
ment parameters. We develop the connection between marginal policy eects and the average
eect of treatment for persons on the margin of indierence between participation in treatment and
nonparticipation, and use this connection to analyze both parameters. We apply our analysis to
estimate the eect of marginal changes in tuition on the return to going to college.
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The Policy Relevant Treatment Eect (PRTE) is the mean eect of changing from a baseline policy
to an alternative policy that provides dierent incentives to participate in treatment (Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2001b, 2005). Identication and estimation of the PRTE is generally dicult. Identi-
cation of the PRTE typically requires large support conditions.
p
N-consistent estimation of the
PRTE parameter is generally not possible.
In many cases proposed policy reforms are incremental in nature and a marginal version of the
PRTE (MPRTE) is all that is required to answer questions of economic interest. This paper develops
the MPRTE and establishes how the MPRTE depends on the direction of a proposed marginal policy
change. We establish that the support conditions required for identifying the MPRTE are very weak.
The essential requirement is availability of a continuous instrument. The MPRTE parameter can
be represented as a weighted average derivative with weights determined by the marginal policy of
interest. The parameter is
p
N-estimable under standard regularity conditions. Thus, the MPRTE
parameter is fundamentally easier to identify and estimate than the PRTE parameter.
We connect the MPRTE to the Average Marginal Treatment Eect (AMTE): the mean ben-
et of treatment for people at the margin of indierence between participation in treatment and
nonparticipation. AMTE is compared to marginal cost in an aggregate benet-cost analysis of
a program. We establish a correspondence between MPRTE parameters and AMTE parameters,
showing that the eect of a marginal policy change in a particular direction is the same as the
average eect of treatment for those at the margin of indierence. We use this correspondence to
produce new insights about the AMTE parameter.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the nonparametric selection model that
underlies our analysis. Section 3 reviews the analysis of the PRTE by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005)
and presents a new interpretation of the PRTE as a function from the space of all possible policies to
the space of eects of policies. This interpretation is key to the analysis in Section 4 which introduces
and analyzes the marginal policy relevant treatment eect (MPRTE). We discuss identication and
estimation of the MPRTE in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. We dene and analyze the AMTE in
Section 7. Section 8 presents an empirical application of our analysis. Section 9 concludes.
12 Nonparametric Selection Model and Our Assumptions
Assume that there are two potential outcomes (Y0;Y1) and a binary treatment choice indicator D.
Outcome Y is written in switching regression form Y = DY1+(1   D)Y0; where Y1 is the potential
outcome that is observed if the agent chooses treatment 1, and Y0 is the potential outcome that
is observed if the agent chooses treatment 0. Y1   Y0 is the individual level treatment eect. We
keep implicit the conditioning on observed variables X that determine Y1 or Y0, and maintain the
assumption that D does not determine X (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005).
Program participation is voluntary. To link this framework to standard choice models, we
characterize the decision rule for program participation by a latent index model:
D = 1[(Z)   V  0] (2.1)
where 1[] is the indicator function taking the value 1 if its argument is true and the value 0
otherwise. From the point of view of the econometrician, Z is observed and V is unobserved.
We maintain the following assumptions:
(A-1) (Y0;Y1;V ) is independent of Z;
(A-2) The distribution of V is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure;




  V = v

< 1, supv E
 
jY0j
  V = v

< 1;
(A-5) 0 < Pr(D = 1) < 1.
These conditions are discussed in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, 2007). Under them, Vytlacil
(2002) establishes the equivalence between the nonparametric latent index model (2.1) and the
monotonicity assumption used by Imbens and Angrist (1994). A necessary condition for (A-3)
is that Z contains a continuous variable (i.e., that there is a continuous instrument for D). We
use this assumption to analyze marginal policy changes, and to identify marginal policy treatment
eects. These conditions should be interpreted as conditional on X, which we have kept implicit.
2For example, (A-1) should be interpreted as saying that (Y0;Y1;V ) is independent of Z conditional
on X, while there can be dependence between (Y0;Y1;V ) and X.
Dene P(Z) as the probability of receiving treatment given Z, P(Z)  Pr(D = 1 j Z) =
FV((Z)) where FV() is the distribution function of V . We sometimes denote P(Z) by P, sup-
pressing the Z argument. We also use U, dened by U = FV(V ) so that U is distributed unit
uniform. In this notation, applying a monotonic transformation to both sides of the argument in
equation (2.1) allows us to write that equation as D = 1[P(Z)  U].
The marginal treatment eect (MTE) plays a fundamental role in our analysis. MTE is dened as
MTE(u)  E(Y1  Y0 j U = u), i.e., the expected treatment eect conditional on the unobservables
which determine participation. For values of u close to zero, MTE(u) is the expected eect of
treatment on individuals who have unobservables that make them most likely to participate in
treatment and who would participate even if the mean scale utility (Z) is small. See Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005, 2007) for more discussion and interpretation of the MTE.
In some of our examples, we consider the following special case of our general model:
(B-1) Suppose (Z) = Z and suppose that FV is strictly increasing. Suppose that the kth compo-
nent of Z, Z[k], has a strictly positive coecient, [k] > 0. Let ~ Z~  = Z   Z[k][k]. Suppose that
the distribution of Z[k][k] conditional on ~ Z~  has a density with respect to Lebesgue measure.
3 The Policy Relevant Treatment Eect
We rst present the Policy Relevant Treatment Eect (PRTE) of Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b,
2005) in order to motivate our marginal version of it. We then reformulate the PRTE as a function
of the proposed policy change. This enables us to dene a sequence of PRTEs corresponding to a
sequence of proposed policy changes.
3.1 Review of PRTE
Following Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b, 2005), consider a class of policies that aect P, the prob-
ability of participation in a program, but that do not aect potential outcomes or unobservables
3related to the selection process, (Y1;Y0;U).1 An example from the literature on the economic returns
to schooling would be policies that change tuition or distance to school but that do not directly
aect potential wages (Card, 2001). We ignore general equilibrium eects.
Let D be the treatment choice that would be made after the policy change. Let P  be the
corresponding probability that D = 1 after the policy change. D is dened by D = 1[P   U].
Let Y  = DY1 +(1  D)Y0 be the outcome under the alternative policy. Following Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005), the mean eect of going from a baseline policy to an alternative policy per net
person shifted is the Policy Relevant Treatment Eect (PRTE), dened when E(D) 6= E(D) as
E(Y j Alternative Policy)   E(Y j Baseline Policy)
E(D j Alternative Policy)   E(D j Baseline Policy)
=











The condition E(D) 6= E(D) is consistent with the program having a non-monotonic eect on
participation as long as the fraction switching into treatment is not exactly oset by the fraction
switching out of treatment. The PRTE parameter gives the normalized eect of a change from a
baseline policy to an alternative policy and depends on the alternative being considered.2 Heckman
and Vytlacil (2005) show that the PRTE can be identied under strong support conditions. In
Section 5, we establish that the marginal version of the PRTE parameter can be identied under
much weaker conditions than are required to identify the PRTE. In Section 6, we establish that,
unlike the PRTE parameter, the MPRTE parameter is generally estimable at a
p
N rate.
We dene PRTE as the average eect per net person shifted into treatment. With this de-
nition, no normalization is required when taking limits to dene the MPRTE, and we obtain an
equivalence between the MPRTE and the average eect for individuals at the margin of indierence
1This restriction can be relaxed to a weaker policy invariance for the distribution of (Y1;Y0;U), see Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005, 2007).
2The PRTE can be interpreted as an economically more explicit version of Stock's (1989) nonparametric policy
analysis parameter for a class of policy interventions with explicit agent preferences where the policies evaluated
operate solely on agent choice sets.
4(AMTE). Under this denition, the MPRTE corresponds to a weighted average derivative and can
be estimated by a weighted average derivative estimator.
Alternatively, we could follow Heckman and Vytlacil (2001b) in dening PRTE without nor-
malizing it by the net change in treatment status, i.e., we could dene PRTE as E(Y )   E(Y ).
However, some normalization is required when taking limits. If we were to dene PRTE in that
manner, and then normalize by E(D) E(D) when taking limits, we would obtain the same limits
as would be obtained from analyzing the marginal version of PRTE dened by equation (3.1). Using
the unnormalized version of PRTE, we can analyze alternative normalizations when taking limits.
In footnote 3 below, we discuss one such normalization which results in an alternative version of
MPRTE that is a rescaled version of the marginal version of PRTE dened by equation (3.1).
3.2 PRTE as a Function of Proposed Policy Changes
The PRTE depends on a policy change only through the distribution of P  after the policy change.
Given our assumptions, FP is sucient to summarize everything about the proposed policy change
that is relevant for calculating the average eect of the policy change. We can thus dene the PRTE
function as a function mapping the proposed policy change (corresponding to a distribution of P )
to the resulting per-person change in outcomes. Expressing the PRTE this way is important in the
next step of our analysis that uses sequences of PRTEs to dene a marginal version of the PRTE.
Let G denote the space of all cumulative distribution functions for random variables that lie in




tdFP(t) i.e., all right-continuous, non-decreasing functions
satisfying G(t) = 1 for t  1, G(t) = 0 for t < 0, and such that the rst moment of G does not
equal the rst moment of FP. Any G 2 G corresponds to a potential distribution of P  and thus
corresponds to a potential alternative policy, with PRTE(G) denoting the corresponding policy










5In many cases, the class of policy alternatives under consideration can be indexed by a scalar
variable. Let P0 = P denote the baseline probability for D = 1. Let M denote a subset of R with
0 2 M. Let fP :  2 Mg denote a class of alternative probabilities corresponding to alternative
policy regimes with associated cumulative distribution functions F. For example, one alternative
policy could increase the probability of attending college by an amount , so that P = P0 + and
F(t) = F0(t ). An alternative policy could change each person's probability of attending college
by the proportion (1 + ), so that P = (1 + )P0 and F(t) = F0( t
1+). The policy intervention
might have an eect similar to a shift in one of the components of Z, say Z[k]. In particular,
suppose Z
[k]
 = Z[k] +  and Z
[j]
 = Z[j] for j 6= k. For example, the kth element of Z might be
college tuition, and the policy under consideration subsidizes college tuition by the xed amount
. Suppose that the linear latent index assumption (B-1) holds. Then P(Z) = FV(Z + [k])
and F(t) = FZ(F
 1
V (t) [k]). Notice that the rst two examples have the form P = q(P0) for
some function q, while the last example has the form P = FV(Z[ k] [k] + q(Z[k])[k]). We will
explore more general examples in the next section.
4 Marginal Policy Changes
The PRTE is dened for a discrete change from a baseline policy to a xed alternative. We now
consider a marginal version of the PRTE parameter that corresponds to a marginal change from
a baseline policy. It is expositionally convenient to think of the treatment as college attendance
and the policy as a change in tuition. The marginal version of the PRTE depends on the nature
of the perturbation that denes the marginal change. For example, a policy change that subsidizes
tuition by a xed amount has dierent eects than a policy change that subsidizes tuition by a
xed proportion. The limits of these two policies for innitesimally small subsidies are dierent.
To dene the marginal version of the PRTE, we could consider the limit of PRTE(G) as G gets
close to FP in some metric. We could dene the marginal PRTE as a directional derivative. For
ease of exposition, we do not work with this more general formulation but instead work with a
one-dimensional version of it. Thus we do not analyze general perturbations within the function
space G but only one-dimensional curves within G.
6Consider a class of alternative policies indexed by , fF :  2 Mg, where 0 is a limit point of
M, and 0 represents the baseline policy so that F0 = FP. Consider the eect of a marginal change
in  in a neighborhood of the current base policy of  = 0. When the limit exists, we can dene
the marginal policy relevant treatment eect as
MPRTE(fFg) = lim
!0PRTE(F),
where the MPRTE parameter depends on the class of alternative policies fF :  2 Mg, i.e., on
the choice of a particular curve within G. Thus, the MPRTE can be seen as a path-derivative along
the path fF :  2 Mg. We impose the following sucient conditions for the limit to exist:
(A-6) For  in a neighborhood of 0, F has a density f with respect to Lebesgue measure, f is
dierentiable in , supt2(0;1) j @








MTE(u) !MPRTE (u;fFg)du; (4.1)











0 p ( @
@f0(p))dp
, (4.2)
where we write @
@F0(p) and @
@f0(p) as shorthand expressions for @
@F(p)j=0 and @
@f(p)j=0,
respectively. An alternative way to express the form of the weights uses the property that 0  P  1
so that E(P) =
R 1








which makes it clear that the weights always integrate to unity.3
3An alternative way to dene MPRTE that does not require the condition E(D) 6= E(D) normalizes by  instead




 du: With this denition the corresponding weights on MTE are
given by !MPRTE (u;fFg) = @
@F0(u). This change in the normalization only aects the constant of integration for
the weights, and results in an alternative MPRTE that is a rescaled version of the MPRTE analyzed in this paper.
7Just as the PRTE parameter depends on which particular policy counterfactual is being consid-
ered, the marginal PRTE parameter depends on which particular class of policy perturbations is
being considered. Just as the eect of a xed dollar amount tuition subsidy will result in a dierent
PRTE parameter than a proportional tuition subsidy, the limit parameter for a marginal change
in an additive tuition subsidy will be dierent from the limit parameter for a marginal change in a
proportional tuition subsidy. Of particular interest to us are the following two cases for which we
will dene classes of functions. Let Q denote the set of sequences of functions fq() :  2 Mg such
that q(t) is strictly increasing in t for any  2 M; such that q0() is the identity function; such
that q(t) is dierentiable in  with @
@q(t) bounded; such that r is a bounded function where
r denotes the inverse of q; and such that r is dierentiable in  with @
@r(t) bounded. The
following examples can be trivially modied to allow q to be monotonically decreasing.
(Ex-1) Suppose that the alternative sequence of policies have the form P = q(P0) for some













(Ex-2) Suppose that the alternative sequence of policies shifts the kth component of Z, Z[k], to
q(Z[k]) for some fqg 2 Q. Suppose that Assumption (B-1) holds. Then
F(t) =
Z
FZ[k]j ~ Z~ [r(
F
 1
V (t)   s
[k] )]f ~ Z~ (s)ds;
and
!MPRTE(u;fFg) =
E ~ Z~ 
h
fZ[k]j ~ Z~ [
F 1








0 E ~ Z~ 
h
fZ[k]j ~ Z~ [
F 1









The expressions in equations (4.4) and (4.5) look dierent, but both can be represented as
weighted densities
!MPRTE(u;fFg) = fP(u)h(u)=E(h(P)) (4.6)
for some function h(). For (Ex-1), this form is immediate, substituting h(u) = @
@r0(u). For (Ex-2),
8note that, for !MPRTE(u;fFg) given by equation (4.5),
!MPRTE(u;fFg) 6= 0 )
Z




V (u)   s
[k]

f ~ Z~ (s)ds 6= 0
, fZ(F
 1
V (u)) 6= 0
, fP(u)fV(F
 1
V (u)) 6= 0
) fP(u) 6= 0 ;
where we use the fact that Pr[P(Z)  u] = Pr[Z  F
 1




V (u)) . Thus, the weights for (Ex-2) are of the form !MPRTE(u;fFg) = fP(u)h(u)=C for some
function h and some constant C. The weights integrate to one, because C =
R
fP(u)h(u)du =
E(h(P)). Thus the weights for both (Ex-1) and (Ex-2) are of the form (4.6). This expression plays
an important role when we consider identication and estimation of the MPRTE.
Special cases include q(t) = t +  and q(t) = (1 + )t, for policy changes that act like
constant shifts or proportional shifts either in P or in a component of Z. For example 1, if q(t) =
t +  then !MPRTE(u;fFg) = fP(u), so that the MPRTE weights MTE according to the density
of P(Z). In contrast, if q(t) = (1 + )t, then !MPRTE(u;fFg) = ufP(u)=E(P). Thus, for
example, the limit form associated with increasing the probability of college attendance by a xed
amount and the limit form associated with increasing the probability of college attendance by a
proportional amount produce dierent weights on MTE. The limit of the latter puts higher weight
on MTE for higher u evaluation points, i.e., puts higher weight on MTE for individuals whose
unobservables make them less likely to go to college. For example 2, setting q(t) = t +  results






E(fV (Z)) ; which again will weight the MTE and thus
weight people with dierent unobserved preferences for treatment dierently from the way MTE is
weighted in the other examples.
95 Identication
Equations (3.3)-(3.4) and (4.1)-(4.2) show that both the PRTE and MPRTE treatment parameters




MTE(u) !j (u) du, (5.1)
where !j (u) is the weighting function corresponding to treatment parameter j, and where !j will
depend on which policy change/marginal policy change is being considered. Heckman and Vytlacil
(1999, 2005) show that, under our assumptions, the standard treatment parameters can also be
expressed in this form and that the form can be used for identication. In particular, the weights
are often easy to identify, in which case equation (5.1) implies identication of the parameter if
we can identify the MTE at any evaluation point for which the weights are non-zero. Under our
assumptions, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) show that the MTE can be identied by the
method of local instrumental variables (LIV) at any p in the support of P(Z):
@
@p
E(Y jP(Z) = p) = MTE(p).4 (5.2)
Any parameter that can be represented as a weighted average of MTE can be identied by rst
estimating MTE over the appropriate support and then integrating the identied MTE function
using the appropriate weights. In order to identify parameter j, not only does P(Z) have to be a
continuous random variable, but in addition the support of P(Z) must contain all values of u such
that !j(u) 6= 0. For the standard treatment parameters, identication requires strong conditions on
the support of the distribution of P(Z). For example, for the average treatment eect, E(Y1  Y0),
the weights are given by !ATE(u) = 1 for u 2 [0;1] so that the required support condition is that the
support of P(Z) is the full unit interval. It is possible to point-identify the parameters under only
slightly weaker conditions than those required by this strategy, as shown in Heckman and Vytlacil
4LIV can be interpreted as the limit form of the Imbens and Angrist (1994) LATE parameter (see Heckman and
Vytlacil, 1999). The ideas of the marginal treatment eect and the limit form of LATE were rst introduced in the
context of a parametric normal generalized Roy model by Bj orklund and Mott (1987), and were analyzed more
generally in Heckman (1997). Angrist, Graddy, and Imbens (2000) also dene and develop a limit form of LATE.
10(2001a, 2007).
Consider identication of PRTE. Suppose that we can identify FP and thus the weights. In
order to identify the parameter using the strategy just discussed, the support of P(Z) must contain
all values of u such that FP(u)   FP(u) 6= 0. Thus, if the support of P  is not contained in the
support of P, it is not possible to identify the PRTE.
For example, suppose that the largest estimated probability of attending college is strictly less
than 1. For analyzing a tuition subsidy policy, it is possible that the largest probability of attending
college under a tuition subsidy will be greater than the largest probability of attending college
without a tuition subsidy so that the support condition for identifying the corresponding PRTE
parameter is violated. More generally, in examples (Ex-1) and (Ex-2) in Section 4, the PRTE
parameters will not be identied unless the support of P is the full unit interval. Thus, the very
strong support conditions required for identication of the standard treatment parameters are also
required for identication of the PRTE parameter.
In contrast, the MPRTE parameter can generally be identied under weaker assumptions. The
MPRTE weights are non-zero only if the density of P(Z) is nonzero. Consider the classes of
MPRTE parameters produced from examples (Ex-1) and (Ex-2). For policy counterfactuals that
act like transformations of P(Z) as in (Ex-1), or act like transformations of Z as in (Ex-2), we
have from equation (4.6) that !MPRTE(u;fFg) 6= 0 ) fP(u) 6= 0, so that the MPRTE parameters
of (Ex-1) and (Ex-2) can be identied without any additional support conditions even though the
corresponding PRTE parameters cannot be identied for any . In these examples, the marginal
PRTE parameters place positive weight on MTE(u) for values of u where the density of P is positive,
i.e., they only place positive weight on MTE(u) for values of u where we can use local instrumental
variables to point identify MTE(u). Thus, even though in each example the PRTE is not identied
for any value of  6= 0 without large support assumptions, the marginal PRTE is identied using the
assumption that P is a continuous random variable. The MPRTE parameter is thus fundamentally
easier to identify than either the conventional treatment parameters or the PRTE parameters.5
5As is clear from our analysis, Assumption (A-4) can be relaxed to only require that E(jY1j j V = v) and
E(jY0j j V = v) are bounded for v contained in any arbitrarily small enlargement of the support of F
 1
V (P(Z)).
116 Issues in Estimation
In addition to the support requirement, an additional diculty in estimating the standard treatment
parameters is that under our assumptions they are not
p
N-estimable. Suppose that P is known.





E(Y jP(Z) = p)!j (p) dp = E(g
0(P)qj(P)), (6.1)
where g0(p) = @
@pE(Y j P(Z) = p) and qj(p) = !j (p)=fP(p), and we assume that wj(p) 6= 0 )
fP(p) 6= 0 as is required for identication. A critical requirement for weighted average derivative
estimators to be
p
N-consistent is that qj(p)fP(p) vanish on the boundary of the support of P (see
Newey and Stoker, 1993). Requiring that qj(p)fP(p) = 0 on the boundaries of the support of P(Z)
is equivalent to requiring that !j (p) = 0 at the boundaries of the support of P. This requirement
is not satised by conventional treatment parameters. For example, the average treatment eect
imposes the requirement that !ATE (p) = 1 8 p 2 [0;1], so that !ATE(p) 6= 0 at the boundaries of
the support and E(g0(P)qATE(P)) is not
p
N-estimable under our assumptions. A parallel analysis
applies to the PRTE parameters. From equation (3.4), !PRTE (p;G) = 0 at the boundaries of the
support of P only if FP(t) G(t) = 0 at the boundaries of the support of P. This requires equality
of the supremum of the supports of the two distributions, so that a necessary condition for
p
N-
consistent estimation of the PRTE is that the policy counterfactual does not increase or decrease
the largest value of the probability of participation.
In contrast, the MPRTE parameters are
p
N-estimable under standard regularity conditions.
Consider examples of the form of (Ex-1), policy changes that act like transformations of the P, or
examples of the form of (Ex-2), policy changes that act like transformations of Z. From equation
(4.6), !MPRTE (;fFg) 6= 0 only if fP() 6= 0, and so we again have that the weights will equal
zero on the boundaries of the support of P(Z) if fP goes to zero on the boundary of the support.
In each of these cases, the marginal PRTE parameter is given by a weighted average derivative,
E(g0(P)q(P)) with weights such that qj(p)fP(p) equals zero on the boundary of the support of P if
fP(p) = 0 on the boundary of the support of P. Thus, each of these parameters is
p
N-estimable
12under appropriate regularity conditions (see Newey and Stoker, 1993).
Our discussion thus far ignores three issues. First, in general P(Z) is not known but must be
estimated. Second, the weights sometimes need to be estimated. Third, we have not analyzed how
to deal with observed regressors X that enter the outcome equations for Y0 and Y1. If X contains
only discrete elements, then the estimation theory just presented is still valid conditional on X.
If X contains continuous elements, then we may instead work with marginal PRTE parameters
averaged over the distribution of X to obtain
p
N-estimates. One example of an estimator of the
weighted average derivative that applies to our problem is the sieve minimum distance estimator of
Ai and Chen (2007). We next consider identication and estimation of average marginal treatment
eects.
7 The Average Marginal Treatment Eect
We now relate the MPRTE parameter to the Average Marginal Treatment Eect (AMTE), the
average eect of treatment for the marginal person who is indierent between participation and
nonparticipation. More precisely, for a given choice of how to measure the distance between P and
U, and thus for a given choice of how to measure how close an individual is to being indierent
between treatment or not, we dene the AMTE as the average eect of treatment for those who
are arbitrarily close to being indierent between treatment or not. While the MPRTE depends
on the direction of the marginal policy change, the AMTE parameter depends on the metric by
which one measures how close individuals are to being indierent. We show an equivalence between
the MPRTE and AMTE parameters. Choosing a particular distance measure for the AMTE is
equivalent to examining a particular policy direction for the MPRTE. The eect of a marginal
policy change in a particular direction is equal to the average eect of treatment for those at the
margin of indierence in the precise sense that a marginal policy change in that direction would
change their treatment participation decision.
Consider the average eect of treatment for those who are close to being indierent between
13treatment or not. For any metric m(;), we have







Suppose the metric m(;) is such that, for some strictly monotonic and dierentiable function q,
m(P;U) = jq(P)   q(U)j: Let r denote the inverse of q. Then, under the regularity conditions
that allow us to interchange limits and integration, the average eect for those arbitrarily close to
indierence between treatment or not is
lim












The form of the weights depends on the choice of a metric. Choosing dierent ways to measure the
distance between P and U, and thus dierent ways of measuring how close individuals are to being
indierent between treatment or not, produces dierent weighting functions. For any choice of q, the
weights will be positive, will integrate to unity, and will only be non-zero where the density of P is
non-zero, but otherwise the weights can be shifted around arbitrarily by picking alternative metrics.
One might think that there is a natural way to pick a particular metric. Taking m(P;U) = jP  Uj
seems more natural than taking m(P;U) = jqP   qUj for general q() including F
 1
V (). However,
under assumption (B-1), it is not any more natural to pick m(P;U) = jP   Uj than it is to pick
m(P;U) = jF
 1
V (P)   F
 1
V (U)j = jZ   V j. Yet, the two choices of metrics give dierent limit
results.
Ambiguity over which metric to use for the AMTE can be resolved by connecting the AMTE
to the marginal PRTE. The connection is natural. Marginal policy changes only aect people who
are indierent between treatment or not. Thus there is a close connection between the two types
of parameters. An arbitrary choice of a metric to dene AMTE lacks an economic motivation.
The choice of which marginal policy to study to dene the AMTE is well motivated. Comparing
equations (4.6) and (7.1), we see a duality between MPRTE parameters and alternative denitions
14of the AMTE. For example, note that AMTE taking q to be the identity function is exactly the
MPRTE expression for policy alternatives of the form P = P + . If (B-1) holds, then AMTE
taking q() = F
 1
V () is exactly the MPRTE expression for policy alternatives of the form of changing
one component of Z by . Dierent policy alternatives dene dierent AMTE parameters.
Consider an analysis of college attendance. Each marginal PRTE parameter denes a dierent
set of \marginal people" who are indierent between college participation or not and who would
change their college participation in response to a marginal change in the policy. Notice that any
inframarginal individual with (Z) > V will not be aected by any marginal policy change. Only
individuals with (Z) = V will be aected by a marginal change in the policy. Each marginal PRTE
parameter will correspond to a dierent valid denition of the average marginal treatment eect.
The average eect of college attendance on those who are on the margin dened by an innitesimal
level shift in college tuition is dierent from the average eect of college attendance on those who
are on the margin dened by an innitesimal proportional shift in college tuition.
Since each average marginal treatment eect can be equated with a marginal PRTE parameter,
we can use the analysis of Section 4 to dene the AMTE so that it can be identied without large
support assumptions. In addition, the parameter will be
p
N-estimable under appropriate regularity
conditions. Thus, under our assumptions, the AMTE parameter is fundamentally easier to identify
and to estimate than are the conventional treatment parameters.
8 Applying the Analysis to Data
Following Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2006), we estimate the MTE for a sample of white
males from the NLSY.6 Using this sample, we also estimate the weights needed to construct the
MPRTE parameters corresponding to policy perturbations in alternative directions. We group
individuals in two groups: persons with a high school education or below who do not go to college
(D = 0) and persons with some college or above (D = 1). The outcome variable is the log of the
average of non-missing values of the hourly wage between 1989 and 1993, which we interpret as an
estimate of the log hourly wage in 1991. We estimate the selection probability P(Z) using a logit.
6See the Web Appendix A at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/evaluating_marginal_policy/.
15We assume that Y1 = X1 +U1, Y0 = X0 +U0, and that U1 and U0 are independent of X, so that
the marginal treatment eect is given by MTE(x;u) = x(1   0) + E (U1   U0jU = u).7
In order to compute the MTE, we estimate E (Y jX;P) = X0 + PX(1   0) +K (P), and we
take its derivative with respect to P: MTE(x;p) =
@E(Y jX=x;P=p)
@p . We estimate 1;0 applying the
partially linear regression method of Robinson (1988). K () is estimated using locally quadratic
regression.8 We trim 2% of the observations from the extremes of the distribution of P, which
means that we are only able to identify the MTE at evaluation points between 0.1 and 0.93. Thus,
we can only identify parameters over this support. We present annualized returns, obtained by
dividing the MTE (and the parameters it generates) by 4 (corresponding to 4 years of college).
Figure 1 plots three alternative MPRTE weights. We take two cases based on example 1,
where qA
(P) = P +  and qC
(P) = (1 + )P. A third case is taken from example 2 (B), where
qB
(Z[k]) = Z[k] + .9 !C
MPRTE puts more weight than !A
MPRTE on higher values of U, and both sets
of weights are zero in the region of U for which we cannot identify the MTE. The intuitive reason
for this pattern is that a proportional change in P results in larger absolute changes for high levels
of P than for low levels of P, while an additive change in P results in uniform changes in P across
the whole distribution. The MPRTE for a marginal proportional change in P is estimated to be
7The components of Z are: AFQT and its square, mother's years of schooling and its square, permanent local
earnings (average earnings between 1973 and 2000) in the county of residence at age 17 and its square, permanent
local unemployment (average unemployment between 1973 and 2000) in state of residence at age 17 and its square,
the presence of a four year college in the county of residence at age 17, average tuition in public four year colleges in
the county of residence at age 17, log average wage in the county of residence at age 17, unemployment rate in the
state of residence at age 17. The latter four variables are excluded from the set of variables in the wage equations
(X) for D = 1 and D = 0, which are: years of experience and its square, log average wage in the county of residence
in 1991, unemployment rate in the state of residence in 1991, AFQT and its square, mother's years of schooling and
its square, permanent local earnings (average earnings between 1973 and 2000) in the county of residence at age
17 and its square, and permanent local unemployment (average unemployment between 1973 and 2000) in state of
residence at age 17 and its square.
8We rst run kernel regressions of each X on ^ P using a bandwidth of 0.05 and trimming 2% of the observations,
and we compute the resulting residuals. We then estimate a linear regression of the outcome variable on these
residuals and obtain estimates ^ 1 and ^ 0. In order to estimate K () and its rst derivative we run a locally quadratic
regression of Y  X ^ 0+ ^ PX(^ 1  ^ 0) on ^ P, using a bandwidth of 0.322 (determined by cross validation),and trimming
2% of the observations. ^ K0 () is constructed by taking the coecient on the linear term of the locally quadratic
regression.
9In the empirical work we impose an index suciency restriction when estimating fPjX: fPjX = fPjX. To
estimate the scalar index X, we use the fact that fPjX = fPjX implies that E(PjX) = E (PjX) to estimate 















5). We use a
bandwidth equal to 1:06
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5). The gure xes X at  X The weights are rescaled so that both
the MTE and the weights t in the gure.
160:1296 while the MPRTE for a marginal additive change in P is estimated to be 0:0880, since the
former puts more weight on high values of U where the MTE is estimated to be smaller.!B
MPRTE
puts more weight than either !A
MPRTE or !C
MPRTE in the center of the support of U, and the MPRTE
is estimated to be 0:1274. Figure 1 also shows that corresponding to each MPRTE weight there is
an AMTE weight, dened by dierent choices of metric for measuring the distance between P and
U. For case A, m(P;U) = jP   Uj. For case B, m(P;U) = jF
 1
V (P)   F
 1
V (U)j = jZ   V j. For
case C, m(P;U) = jP
U   1j.
9 Summary and Conclusions
This paper extends the analysis of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005, 2007) by using the marginal
treatment eect (MTE) to identify the eect of a marginal policy change, and to identify the average
eect of treatment on individuals who are indierent between treatment or not. Conventional
treatment parameters and the Policy Relevant Treatment Eect require large support conditions
for identication, and often are not
p
N-estimable. Under our assumptions the marginal policy
eect parameters and the average marginal treatment eects are generally identied without large
support conditions and are
p
N-estimable. An analysis of the eect of marginal changes in tuition
policies on college attendance illustrates the empirical relevance of this analysis.
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MPRTE: Pα = P0 + α; AMTE: |P - U| ≤ ε
MPRTE: Pα(Z) = Fv (Zγ + αγ[k] ); AMTE: |Zγ - V | ≤ ε
MPRTE: Pα = (1 + α)P0 ; AMTE: |P - 1| ≤ ε U
This gure plots the marginal treatment eect (MTE = E (Y1   Y0jX = x;U = u)) and the
marginal policy relevant treatment eect (MPRTE) weights for three types of policy shifts: P A
 =
P + , P B
a (Z) = FV
 
Z + [k]
, and P C
 = (1 + )P, where P is the probability of receiving
treatment conditional on the observed covariates (Z). The equivalent denitions of the AMTE
correspond, respectively, to the following three metrics for measuring the distance between P and
U (m(P;U)): jP   Uj, jZ   V j, and jP
U   1j. The MTE, the MPRTE, and the AMTE weights
are evaluated at values of X such that E (Y1   Y0jX) = 0:13. The average marginal policy eects
are 0.1296 for the additive shift in P (A), 0.1274 for the additive shift in Z (B), and 0.0880 for
the proportional shift in P (C). Estimated from NLSY data (see Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil,
2006, for details on estimating MTE).
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This Draft, July 9, 2009A Description of the NLSY Data
We restrict the NLSY sample to white males (excluding the oversample of poor whites and military).
We dene high school graduates as individuals having a high school degree or below.1 We dene
participation in college as having attended some college or having completed more than 12 grades
in school. The wage variable that is used is an average of deated (to 1983) non-missing hourly
wages reported in 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993. We delete all wage observations that are below
1 or above 100. Experience is actual work experience in weeks (we divide it by 52 to express it as a
fraction of a year) accumulated from 1979 to 1991 (annual weeks worked are imputed to be zero if
they are missing in any given year). The remaining variables that we include in the X and Z vectors
are mother's years of schooling, schooling corrected AFQT, the presence of a four-year college in
the SMSA of residence at age 14 (from Kling, 2001),2 average tuition in public four year colleges in
the county of residence at age 17 (deated to 1993), local average earnings in the SMSA of residence
at 17 and local unemployment rate in the state of residence at age 17, local average earnings in
the SMSA of residence in 1991 and local unemployment rate in the state of residence in 1991, and
average (between 1979 and 2000) local earnings in the SMSA where the individual resided at age
17 and average (between 1979 and 2000) local unemployment rate in state where the individual
resided at age 17. SMSA earnings correspond to the average wage per job in the SMSA constructed
using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, deated to 2000. The state unemployment rate
data come from the BLS website. However, from the BLS website it is not possible to get state
unemployment data for all states for all the 1970s. Data are available for all states from 1976 on,
and for 29 states for 1973, 1974 and 1975. Therefore for some of the individuals we have to assign
them the unemployment rate in the state of residence in 1976 (which will correspond to age 19 for
those born in 1957 and age 18 for those born in 1958). Annual records on tuition, enrollment, and
location of all public four year colleges in the United States were constructed from the Department
of Education's annual Higher Education General Information Survey and Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System \Institutional Characteristics" surveys. By matching location with county
1For a description of the NLSY 1979, see Bureau of Labor Statistics (2001).
2The distance variable we use is the one used in Kling (2001), available at the Journal of Business and Economics
Statistics website.
1of residence, we determined the presence of four-year colleges. Tuition measures are taken as
enrollment weighted averages of all public four-year colleges in a person's county of residence (if
available) or at the state level if no college is available. SMSA and state of residence at 17 are not
available for everyone in the NLSY, but only for the cohorts born in 1962, 1963 and 1964 (age 17
in 1979, 1980 and 1981). However, SMSA and state of residence at age 14 is available for most
respondents. Therefore, we impute location at 17 to be equal to location at 14 for cohorts born
between 1957 and 1962 unless location at 14 is missing, in which case we use location in 1979 for
the imputation. Many individuals report having obtained a bachelors degree or more and, at the
same time, having attended only 15 years of schooling (or less). We recode years of schooling for
these individuals to be 16. This variable is only used to annualize the returns to schooling (divide
returns to college by 4, which is the average dierence in years of schooling between individuals in
each schooling group. To remove the eect of schooling on AFQT we implement the procedure of
Hansen, Heckman, and Mullen (2004).
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